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Summary 
This paper analyzes performance aspects of Soft Input 
Decryption and L-values. Soft Input Decryption is a novel 
method which uses L-values (soft output) of a SISO 
channel decoder for the correction of input of Soft Input 
Decryption (SID blocks) which have been modified during 
the transmission over a noisy channel. The method is 
based on the combination of cryptography and channel 
coding improving characteristics of both of them. The 
algorithm, strategies and scenarios of Soft Input 
Decryption are described. 
 
The results of the tested performance of L-values show 
how many L-values are necessary for the correction of 
SID blocks. This number is higher than the number of 
wrong bits. This difference is presented. The number of L-
values is estimated for different lengths of SID blocks as 
well as for different Eb/N0 ratios.  Space characteristics of 
L-values are not analyzed, because they depend on the 
used SISO decoding algorithm. In this paper, Maximum 
A-Posteriori (MAP) algorithm is used. 
 
The time performance of Soft Input Decryption depends 
on the used cryptographic mechanism for the verification 
of the cryptographic check values (digital signatures 
(based on Elliptic Curve Cryptography), MACs (based on 
CBC-DES) and H-MACs (based on SHA-1)).  
 
The combination of the performance of L-values and time 
performance gives an estimation, if and when Soft Input 
Decryption can be performed in practice. Further 
optimizations are outlined. 
 
Key words: 
Soft Input Decryption, SISO Channel Decoding, Joint 
Channel Coding and Cryptography, Digital Signatures, 
Elliptic Curve Cryptography. 
1. Introduction 
The combination of a SISO decoder and Decryptor, which 
is analyzed in this paper, can be considered as a 
concatenation of codes: en-/decryptor has the role of an  
 
 
 
outer en-/decoder and the channel encoder/SISO channel 
decoder has the role of an inner en-/decoder has (Fig. 1). 
 
Concatenation of codes, presented as an outer and inner 
code was already devised by Forney in 1966 [1]. In 
literature, it is known as concatenated codes [2], general 
concatenated codes [3] or super channel codes. The inner 
code is generally short and decoded with a soft decision 
decoding algorithm, while the outer code is generally 
longer and decoded with an algebraic decoding method 
[2].  
 
In most cases a convolutional code is used as an inner 
code in combination with a Reed Solomon code or another 
convolutional code as an outer code. Such a type of 
concatenated codes can be compared to the combination of 
codes investigated in this work (Fig.1). Two good 
characteristics are the result of such a concatenated 
schema: good error performance because of the use of 
SISO principle and good security performance as the 
result of the use of the cryptographic mechanisms. 
 
The next common point of this work with previous works 
in coding is the idea of the use of reliability in decoding. 
There are several works which explore the reliability-
based soft-decision decoding algorithms for linear block 
codes, using the concept of error correction by ordering 
the decoded bits by their reliability values. The values of 
soft outputs of the decoder have been used as reliability 
values.  
 
The idea of inversion of the least probable bits (with the 
lowest reliability values) originated from Chase decoding 
algorithms [4] in 1972, which were the generalization of 
the GMD (Generalized Minimum Distance) algorithms 
from 1966 [1]. These algorithms have been applied to a 
binary (n, k) linear block code and are referenced as LRP 
(Least Reliability Positions) algorithms. 
 
Chase algorithms generate a list of candidate code words 
by complementing all possible combinations of bits with 
the lowest reliability values. The candidate with the best 
metric is the decoded solution.  
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The similarity to the method of the Soft Input Decryption, 
is the use of L-values reordered and iteratively tested. The 
difference is that Soft Input Decryption uses two decoders 
(inner and outer) and a non-linear block code 
(cryptographic algorithms). Two codes enable the use of 
feedback from the outer to inner code. 
 
The next group of algorithms, which use decoding based 
on ordering of L-values, is a group of MRIP (Most 
Reliable Independent Positions) - reprocessing decoding 
algorithms, as the Most Reliable Basis [MRB], the Least 
Reliable Basis [LRB] and the Ordered Statistic Decoding 
Algorithm [2].  
 
Joint source channel coding is the another topic related to 
this work. The cooperation between the source and 
channel decoder enables a better use of information of 
both decoders and better decoding results [5]. It is based 
on the turbo – principle, as well as Softbit - Source 
Decoding [6] and Iterative Source – Channel decoding [7]. 
The similarity to Soft Input Decryption is the use of 
iterative information exchange between the two elements 
of the receiver: channel and source decoder, in case of 
joint source channel coding, rsp. channel decoder and 
decryptor in case of Soft Input Decryption. 
 
 
 
Fig. 1  Communication System using Concatenated Codes. 
2. Soft Input Decryption Algorithm 
Soft Input Decryption [8] is a method for the correction of 
SID blocks which contain cryptographic check values 
(digital signatures, MACs, H-MACs) by using L-values as 
the output of the SISO channel decoder. Cryptographic 
check values provide data integrity, data origin 
authentication and non repudiation [9].  
 
Soft Input Decryption works block oriented. The input for 
Soft Input Decryption contains data which are secured by 
cryptographic check values. The block which has to be 
corrected by Soft Input Decryption after channel decoding 
is called SID block (Soft Input Decryption block). It may 
contain data and cryptographic check values, or just 
cryptographic check values, depending on the used 
scenario (see Section 2.4).  
 
In Fig. 2 the  standard verification process without Soft 
Input Decryption is presented. 
 
 
 Fig. 2  Verification of a SID block without Soft Input Decryption. 
 
The algorithm of Soft Input Decryption (Fig. 3) is as 
follows: 
 
The Soft Input Decryption is successfully completed, if 
the verification of the cryptographic check value is 
successful, i.e. the output is “true”. If the verification is 
negative, the soft output of the channel decoder is 
analyzed and the bits with the lowest |L|-values are flipped 
(XOR 1). Then the decryptor performs the verification 
process and proves the result of the verification again. If 
the verification is negative, bits with another combination 
of the lowest |L|-values are changed. This iterative process 
will stop when the verification is successful or the needed 
resources are consumed. 
 
In the case that the attempts for correction fail, the number 
of modified bits is too large as a result of a very noisy 
channel, a very long SID block or an attack, so that the 
resources are not sufficient to find the correct content of a 
SID block.  
 
It may happen that the attempts for the correction of a SID 
block succeed, but the content of a SID block is not equal 
to the original one: a collision happened. This case has a 
negligible probability if the length of the cryptographic 
check values are chosen under security aspects (for 
example, considering the “birthday paradox”).  
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Fig. 3  Algorithm of Soft Input Decryption. 
3. Simulations and Results 
The chosen length of the SID block is 320 bit. The reason 
for this length of a SID block is that this is a size of a 
digital signature based on Elliptic Curve Cryptography 
over GF(2160) or GF(p) with ld(p) = 160. Further on BPSK 
modulation, the model of an AWGN channel, as well as a 
convolutional and a turbo code [10] are used in the 
simulations. The used convolutional encoder has a code 
rate r = 1/2 and a constraint length m = 2. The turbo 
encoder with r = 1/3 is based on two parallel RSC 
convolutional encoders with r = ½ and a block interleaver 
of depth 17 [12]. The turbo decoder performs 3 iterations. 
The decoder (convolutional and turbo) uses a MAP 
algorithm [11]. The results in Fig. 4 are shown for Eb/N0 > 
1.5 dB. The simulations have been programmed in C/C++ 
programming language. For each point of the curves 
50.000 tests are performed which are sufficient to be 
representative. 
 
CCER (Cryptographic Check Error Rate) is defined as:  
 
blocksSIDreceivedofnumber
blocksSIDincorrectofnumberCCER =   (1) 
 
An incorrect SID block is a SID block which could not be 
successfully verified or a SID block, which has been 
falsely successfully verified, i.e. a collision happened. 
Vice versa, a correct SID block is a successfully verified 
SID block and no collision happened, i.e. it is identical to 
the sent SID block. 
 
The complement of CCER is:  
blocksSIDreceivedofnumber
blocksSIDcorrectofnumberCCERCCER =−= 1  (2) 
 
CCER is presented in Fig. 4 in relation to Eb/N0. Soft Input 
Decryption is performed for trials up to the 8, rsp. the 16 
lowest |L|-values (i.e. 28 rsp. 216 trials).  
 
The Soft Input Decryption gain [dB] means the reduction 
of CCER by Soft Input Decryption depending on Eb/N0. 
SID blocks can be successfully transmitted over a 
communication channel with Eb/N0 of 2.5 dB using Soft 
Input Decryption. For example, if 1 of 10 SID blocks 
cannot be verified (at 4 dB) without Soft Input 
Decryption, all SID blocks can be corrected in the case of 
convolutional codes. In case of a turbo code CCER can be 
reduced from 1/30 to 0 (at 2.5 dB).  
 
The results in Fig.5 are achieved for different lengths of 
SID blocks using convolutional coding: 128, 160, 320 and 
384 bits, with up to 16 flipped bits corresponding to the 
lowest positions of |L|-values. As expected, the coding 
gain of Soft Input Decryption is influenced by the length 
of a SID block: it is lower when a SID block is longer.  
  
In the following figures and sections a convolutional code 
is used only, because the simulations of convolutional 
codes are faster than of turbo codes and the coding gains 
of turbo codes are similar to those of convolutional codes 
(compare to Fig. 4). 
 
 
Fig. 4 Decrypting gain of 320 bit SID block [8] 
a) Convolutional code without Soft Input Decryption 
a) b) Convolutional code with Soft Input Decryption using up to the 8 
lowest |L|-values 
c) as b.), but using up to the 16 lowest |L|-values 
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d)Turbo code without Soft Input Decryption 
e)Turbo code with Soft Input Decryption using up to the 8 lowest |L|-
values 
f)as e.), but using up to the 16 lowest |L|-values 
 
 
 
Fig. 5 CCER Coding gain of Soft Input Decryption using up to 16 lowest 
|L|-values, for different lengths of SID blocks  
 
4. Strategies of Soft Input Decryption 
The module “Changing of bits of SID block” (see Fig. 3) 
contains the strategy, in which sequence bits and 
combinations of bits of the SID block are changed, before 
the next verification is achieved. Depending on the 
strategy of Soft Input Decryption, different schedules of 
bit correction are possible.  
 
The static strategy of Soft Input Decryption is used for the 
results of Chapter 3. Proposals for other strategies are also 
given in this Chapter. 
 
4.1 Static Strategy 
 
If the first verification after starting Soft Input Decryption 
is not successful, the bit with the lowest |L|-value of the 
SID block is flipped, assuming that the wrong bits are 
probably those with the lowest |L|-values. If the 
verification is again not successful, the bit with the second 
lowest |L|-value is changed. The next try will flip the bits 
with the lowest and second lowest |L|-value, then the bit 
with the third lowest |L|-value, etc. The process is limited 
by the number of bits with the lowest |L|-values, which 
should be tested. The strategy follows a representation of 
an increasing binary counter, whereby the lowest bit 
corresponds to the bit with the lowest |L|-value, etc.  
 
The strategy is defined by following algorithm. 
 
The static strategy orders the bits of the SID block by their 
|L|-values starting with the lowest one and monotonly 
increasing. The output of the sort algorithm is represented 
as an example in Fig. 6. j is the increasing sequence of 
positions of |L|-values and Pj indicates the position of the 
bit with the jth lowest |L|-value in the original SID block. 
The length of the SID block is w. 
 
 
 
Fig. 6  Sorted sequence of bits of a SID block (an 
example). 
 
The function “Changing of bits of SID block” of the Soft 
Input Decryption algorithm (Fig. 2) is shown in Fig. 7 in 
detail. 
 
To control the strategy, an incrementing counter i = 1, …, 
2Nmax – 1 is used in binary representation of fixed lengths 
of Nmax with coefficients cij ∈ {0, 1}.  
                            ∑
=
−= max
1
1
, 2
N
j
j
jici                                  (3) 
Nmax is the maximum number of bits to be flipped, rsp. 
2Nmax – 1 is the maximum number of trials, if all 
verifications fail. Each value of the counter i describes one 
trial. The indices j of those coefficients cij which are 
marked (cij = 1) indicate the positions of L-values of the 
bits to be flipped. These positions can be found by using 
the sorted table as in Fig. 6.  
 
The sorted sequence Pj can be limited to PNmax. i is reset to 
0 at the beginning of Soft input Decryption. 
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Fig. 7 Algorithm of the static strategy 
 
The strategy is based on the following assumption: if bits 
are wrong decoded by the channel decoder, than they have 
the lowest |L|-values. Unfortunately, this assumption is not 
true, because L-values are probability based and give only 
an orientation which bits may be wrong decoded. It may 
happen, for example, that combinations of up to 7 bits 
have to be tested, when only 3 bits are wrong. 
 
4.2 Dynamic Strategy 
 
The static strategy sorts the L-values of single bits. The 
dynamic strategy calculates the L-values of groups of bits 
to decide which trial should be performed next. It can 
happen, that a group of bits result in a lower |L|-value than 
a |L|-value of a single bit, i.e. that a specific group of bits 
is probably wrong. By this way, it is possible to find the 
group of wrong bits in only a few trials, not testing all 
combinations of flipped bits untill the bits untill the right 
combination is found like in the static strategy. The 
calculation is based on use of the L algebra [12] and much 
more complex than the static strategy. The elaboration of 
the dynamic strategy is for further study. 
 
4.3 BER Based Strategy 
 
The BER based strategy analyses, which number of errors 
is the most probable in the SID block, under consideration 
of Eb/N0 rsp. BER. To reduce the potential number of tests, 
L-values are taken into account. Example: if Nmax is 16 and 
4 bit errors are most probable for SID blocks of 320 bits, 
then up to ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
4
16
 instead of ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
4
320
tests are performed. If 
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
4
16
 tests are not successful, ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
3
16
tests of 3 bit errors 
and ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
5
16
tests of 5 bit errors have to be tested. The BER 
strategy is also for further study. 
 
5. Application Scenarios 
5.1 Scenario 1 
 
In scenario 1 (Fig. 7) digital signatures giving message 
recovery are used [13]. In this type of digital signatures 
the digital signature is not appended to the message, but 
contains the message, practically the digital signature 
replaces the message. 
 
If the verification process is successful, the message is 
also correctly recovered. The length of the message 
including redundancy is limited by the size of the 
underlying mathematical structure of the used asymmetric 
cryptography. For example, the length has to be shorter 
than 1024 bits, if RSA is used with a length of the 
modulus of 1024 bits, or shorter than 160 bits, if ECC 
(elliptic curve cryptography) is used over GF (2160). 
Algorithms can be found in [13] and [14]. 
 
This scenario can be often found in transaction oriented 
applications exchanging short messages, which have to be 
authentic. Typical examples are measurement values in 
industrial metering systems (electricity, water, gas etc.), 
data generated by sensors, as well as stock exchange rates.  
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Fig. 7 Scenario of signatures giving message recovery 
 
 
5.2 Scenario 2 
Scenario 2 (Fig. 8) considers signatures with appendix 
[15]. Messages signed by signatures with appendix have 
arbitrary lengths, but Soft Input Decryption can only be 
applied to SID blocks of limited lengths (Note: the 
application of a collision free one-way hash function is 
considered here to be part of the signature generation and 
verification process). In this scenario, it is assumed that 
the message and the signature are transmitted separately 
and the SID block consists only of the signature: the 
message is transmitted via a communication channel 
different from the one used for the transmission of the 
digital signature (outband), or via the same 
communication channel (inband). The message itself is 
transmitted first and – if modified during transmission – 
corrected by redundancy within the message, by repetition 
or by agreement of the communication partners. So, it is 
assumed that finally the message is received correctly by 
the receiver. The digital signature is transmitted 
afterwards, either when it is generated on request or when 
the action described by the message should be executed.  
 
Typical examples are legal contracts or bank transactions, 
which are prepared in advance, and the digital signature is 
transmitted at the requested moment. If an error occurs 
during the signature verification, the signature is not 
correct: it has been manipulated or errors occurred during 
the transmission, which can not be corrected by the 
channel decoder. 
 
In this case, the Soft Input Decryption block consists of 
one signature block used for verification of the message.  
 
 
 
Fig. 8 Scenario of signatures with appendix 
 
 
5.3 Scenario 3 
Scenario 3 (Fig. 9) is the most general scenario and 
considers messages with a cryptographic check value: 
MAC [16], H-MAC [17] or digital signatures with 
appendix.  
 
In this case, the SID block consists of a message extended 
by a cryptographic check value.  
 
Typical examples are credit/debit applications and other 
bank applications. 
 
GENERATION VERIFICATION
CHANNEL
MAC/H-MAC/DIG.SIG. MAC/H-MAC/DIG.SIG.
MAC/H-MAC/
DIG.SIG.message
MAC’/H-MAC’/
DIG.SIG.’message’
message message
YES
NO
 
Fig. 9 Scenario of messages with cryptographic check values 
 
At one hand, from the point of view of Soft Input 
Decryption it does not matter which scenario is applied. 
Soft Input Decryption always tries to correct the SID 
block as long as the verification fails. At other hand it is 
interesting to show that there are many aplications for Soft 
Input Decryption, even if the lengths of SID blocks are 
relativly short. 
 
6. Performance aspects of L-values 
6.1. The number of L-values required for correction 
 
If the performance of Soft Input Decryption should be 
estimated, at first it is necessary to consider the reliability 
of the soft input. 
 
Fig. 10 shows the number of L-values needed for 
correction of 95 % of SID blocks for different lengths of 
SID blocks: w = 128, 160, 320 and 384. 
In case of SID blocks of length of 320 bits the usage of up 
to 8 L-values is sufficient for the correction if Eb/N0 > 4 
dB. The number of L-values necessary for correction 
increases exponentially with decreasing of S/N: for Eb/N0 
< 3.5 dB 13 L-values are needed for 95 % correction.  
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Fig. 10 Number of L-values needed for correction of 95 % of SID blocks  
 
 
6.2. The theoretical minimum needed for correction  
 
The problem is that reliability values themselves are not 
reliable. So, the question arises, which is the number of 
errors in a SID block, which is the lower limit of L-values 
to be used by Soft Input Decryption.  
 
The probability Pw,i , that a code word of length w – in this 
case a SID block – contains i errors is: 
 
                          iwiiw ppi
w
P −−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛= )1(,                     (4) 
where p represents BER. 
 
Soft Input Decryption tests all possible combinations of up 
to Nmax L-values. The probability Pw that, after correction 
by Soft Input Decryption, only errors which are longer 
than Nmax will not be corrected is [18]: 
 
                                                                 
∑
+=
−−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=
w
Ni
iwi
w ppi
w
P
1max
)1(                                                         
(5) 
 
Soft Input Decryption corrects the data received from 
channel decoding. Therefore p means the bit error rate 
after the channel decoder. p depends on the quality of a 
MAP decoder. 
 
In the case of 95 % corrected SID blocks, Pw = 0.05. 
                                 
∑ ∑
+= =
−− −⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛−=−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=≥
w
Ni
N
i
iwiiwi
w ppi
w
pp
i
w
P
1 0max
max
)1(1)1(05.0
(6) 
 
Nmax is calculated for the correction of more than 95 % 
errors has been done for lengths of SID blocks of w = 
{128, 160, 320, 384} bits (Fig. 11). 
 
Nmax  in (5) and (6) means the minimum Nmax because the 
case considers the number of L-values for correction of Pw  
wrong bits. 
 
The results are shown in Fig. 11. 
 
 
 
Fig. 11 Theoretically minimum number of bits (minNmax) to be changed  
 
Now, the results of Fig. 10 and 11 can be compared. Fig. 
12 shows the comparison for SID block of 320 bits. The 
reason for the significant difference is the incorrect 
allocation of |L|-values compared to wrong bits, due to 
imperfections in the implementation of MAP decoding 
algorithm. 
 
 
Fig. 12 Comparison of needed and theoretical number of L-values for 
SID block of the length 320 bits 
 
6.3. Estimation of the number of L-values for the 
correction of long SID blocks 
 
In this section the number of needed L-values for the 
correction of SID blocks longer than 384 bits is 
considered, because the application of Soft Input 
Decryption of longer SID blocks seems to be very 
interesting (see Scenario 3 of Section 2.4 or consider RSA 
digital signatures instead of ECC which will be discussed 
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later in this section). The estimation for the number of 
required |L|-values is done by interpolation of the results 
for SID blocks of lengths of 128, 160 and 320 bits and 
extrapolation for longer SID blocks. The results for 384 
bits known by simulations are used for the verification of 
the extrapolation. 
 
Fig. 13 (w = 320, Eb/N0 = 3 dB) shows the percentage of 
corrected SID blocks per |L|-value: 20 % of SID blocks 
are corrected with the lowest |L|-value. Additional 13 % 
are corrected with the second lowest |L|-value; with the 
third lowest |L|-value additional 11 % etc…; with the 15th 
lowest |L|-value additional 1 % more SID blocks are 
corrected than with the 14th lowest |L|-value.  
  
Fig. 13 The percentage of corrected SID blocks per |L|-value 
  
The percentage of corrected SID blocks per |L|-value is 
tested for lengths of 128, 160 and 320 bits and for 
different Eb/N0. The results of tests show curves with a 
negative exponential function of the form (see Fig. 13): 
 
 y = k e-ax                                      (7) 
 
Coefficients k and a depend on the length w of the SID 
block and Eb/N0. This dependence is derived in this section 
and then applied for other values.  
 
As the total percentage of corrected SID blocks is 100 % 
after testing of all L-values, the following condition is 
valid: 
1
1
)1(
11
=−
−== −
−−
=
−
=
∑∑ a awaw
i
ai
w
i
i e
ekeeky         (8) 
 
or, by presenting e-ai as an infinite sum: 
                                                        
awaw
i
i
aw
awaw
a
e
a
e
i
a
e
aaa
e
aaa
e
ek
−−
∞
=
−
−−
−≈−=−
+++
=−
−++++
=−
−=
∑
11
!
1
...
!3!2
1
1...
!3!2
1
1
1
1
32
32
(9) 
 
The negative exponential function is derived for w = {128, 
160, 320} and Eb/N0 = [1, 5.5] dB in steps 0.5 dB. For 
each function a and k are derived approximately and 
shown in Table 2. 
 
The relation between the exponent a and Eb/N0 is observed 
in the next step. S/N is used instead of Eb/N0, respecting 
the code rate of  ½: 
                        
dB
N
E
N
S b 3
0
−=                        (10) 
 
Approximations are done using S/N ratio which is easier 
for calculation. The entries of the first and third row of 
Table 2 is used for approximation by a second order 
polynomial:                      
                        
C
N
SB
N
SAa +⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛+⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛=
2
            (11) 
 
The calculated coefficients A, B and C are shown in Table 
2 for SID blocks of length of 128, 160 and 320 bits. The 
approximation of the dependence of a on S/N is shown in 
Fig. 14. 
 
The coefficients A, B and C have different values 
dependent on the length of SID blocks. A, B and C show a 
linear relation to w. Therefore A, B and C are 
approximated by linear functions of w.  
 
A = A(w) = KA ۔ w + NA                          (12) 
 
  B = B(w) = KB ۔ w + NB                          (13) 
                                                                
C = C(w) = KC ۔ w + NC                          (14) 
 
The values of the linear coefficients are shown in Table 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(IJCSIS) International Journal of Computer Science and Information Security, Vol. 1 No.1 May 2009 
 
Manuscript received , April 2009 
Manuscript revised , May 2009 
 
 
Eb/N0 [dB] 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 
k 0.083 0.127 0.271 0.323 0.418 0.461 0.646 0.733 0.821 
 
w = 128 
a 0.08 0.12 0.24 0.28 0.35 0.38 0.5 0.55 0.6 
k  0.030 0.078 0.127 0.221 0.284 0.47 0.582 0.792 1.059 
 
w= 160 
a 0.038 0.075 0.12 0.2 0.25 0.38 0.46 0.6 0.7 
 k  0.02 0.025 0.062 0.221 0.258 0.419 0.733 1.222 1.454 
 
w = 320 
a  0.02 0.025 0.06 0.2 0.23 0.35 0.5 0.8 0.9 
 
Table 1 Coefficients k and a for SID block of w = 128, 160 and 320 bit
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 Coefficients A, B and C 
 
KA NA KB NB KC NC 
-0.00002 0.043 -0.00015 0.225 -0.00025 0.32 
 
Table 3 Values of linear coefficients KA, NA, KB, NB, KC and NC of coefficients A, B and C  
 
 
Fig. 15 Coefficient a in dependence on Eb/N0 for different lengths of SID 
block 
 
Using equations (7) and (9), the percentage of corrected 
bits (indicated as y in (7)) can be calculated as a function 
of positions of |L|-values (indicated as x in (7)), S/N and 
the length w of a SID block: 
                        
xwNSa
wwNSa
wNSa
ax e
e
ekey ),/(),/(
),/(
1
1 −
−
−
−
−==        (15) 
 
with 
 
                              
)()()(
)()()(,
2
2
NCwKC
N
SNBwKB
N
SNAwKA
wC
N
SwB
N
SwAw
N
Sa
+⋅+⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛⋅+⋅+⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛⋅+⋅
=+⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛⋅+⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛⋅=⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
(16) 
w 128 160 320 
A 0.04 0.04 0.037 
B 0.206 0.201 0.177 
C 0.288 0.28 0.24 
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If the number of |L|-values needed for correction are 
indicated by x, a normalized distribution function of 
percentage of correction by xth L-value y can be expressed, 
using equation (16), as: 
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(17) 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
If the number x0 of L-values needed for correction of y(x0) 
percentage of errors has to be, equation (7) is expressed 
as: 
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and x0 is found as: 
 
                                                         
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−−≈ − )1)((1
1ln1
0
0 awexya
x                (19) 
 
It is noted that equation (19) is based on an interpolation 
of Eb/N0 = [1, 4] dB (i.e. S/N = [-2, 2] dB) and w = [128, 
160, 320].  
 
y(x0) can be between 0 and 100 [%], but it is 95 % in this 
paper. 
 
The maximum position of minimum |L|-value can be 
found for different lengths of SID blocks and different 
Eb/N0.  
 
In order to check equation (19), y(x0) (needed L-values) 
for correction of 95% SID blocks of length of 384 bits 
(extrapolation) are compared to the results of tests (Fig. 
16): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 16 Comparison of L-values needed for correction of 95% of  SID 
blocks (w = 384) based on equation (19) and simulations (Fig. 10)  
 
Fig. 16 shows that equation (19) can be trusted and used 
for further extrapolations. 
 
Equation (19) is now applied for SID blocks of length w = 
1024 in Fig. 17. The length of 1024 bits is chosen for 
comparison, because RSA signatures with a signature 
length of 1024 bits offer the same security level as digital 
signatures based on ECC with the signature length of 320 
bits. It may appear attractive to use RSA signatures 
because the verification time is very short when a public 
exponent with a low Hamming weight is used.  
 
Assuming Eb/N0 = 3 dB, the number of L-values is 48 
compared to 14 when using ECC digital signatures of 320 
bit. Therefore, at one hand, it becomes clear, that the use 
of RSA digital signatures is not suitable for Soft Input 
Decryption. At the other hand, the application of Soft 
Input Decryption to longer blocks than 1024 bits is 
realistic if Eb/N0 is not too low. 
 
 
Fig. 17 Comparison of L-values needed for correction of 95% of  SID 
blocks with w = 320 and w = 1024 
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Fig. 17 shows that 48 L-values rsp. 248 tests are necessary 
in the case of RSA digital signatures are needed compared 
to 14 rsp. 214 tests in case of ECC digital signatures. 
 
7. Time Performance 
 
Under practical aspects it is important to consider the 
consumed resources of Soft Input Decryption, specifically 
the time needed for the correction of SID blocks. The 
needed time depends on the cryptographic algorithm and 
on the number of L-values which are necessary to correct 
the errors. Therefore the success of Soft Input Decryption 
is highly dependent on the quality of the soft output of the 
channel decoder. 
 
The time needed to perform 28 verifications of digital 
signatures of 320 bits with appendix (based on ECDSA) 
without hash calculation which are not necessary in 
Scenario 2, MACs (CBC MAC – DES with key size of 56 
bit) and H-MACs (SHA-1 with output size of 160 bit) are 
shown in Table 3 – 5. The numbers are based on use of a 
PC with Pentium 4 of 1.7 and 1.8 GHz [19].  
 
The second row of the tables shows the number of 
verifications and consumed time, which is needed for 
testing and correcting bits with up to the 8 lowest |L|-
values. In the case of MAC/H-MAC a new MAC/H-MAC 
is computed, if the changed bit is in the message part. If 
the changed bit is in the MAC/H-MAC part, only a 
comparison to the previously computed MAC/H-MAC is 
performed, which costs almost no time. It is assumed that 
the L-values used for correction are equally distributed 
over the message part and the cryptographic check value.  
 
In the table with the results of digital signatures (Table 3) 
there is an additional third row which assumes an 
optimization of the digital signatures verifications (100 
times faster verification) following the first verification. 
The arithmetic of subsequent verifications is much more 
efficient and faster, if only one bit of the input of  the 
verification is changed compared to one of the preceding 
verifications because only a single point addition has to be 
executed for correction. Example: in the case of ECKDSA 
[13] only one single point addition is necessary for 
correction.  
 
The most interesting result is that digital signatures are 
more suitable for Soft Input Decryption than MAC and H-
MAC, if the assumption, that succeeding verifications 
need only 1 % of the first one, is true. Even if succeeding 
verifications need less than 25 % of the first one, Soft 
Input Decryption with digital signatures is faster than Soft 
Input Decryption with H-MACs or MACs.  
 
 
 Number of 
Verifications 
Time [s]  
1,7 GHz 
Time [s]  
1,8 GHz
1 1 0.0049 0.0044 
2 256  1.2544 1.1264 
3 1st  + 255 
similar 
0.0174 0.0156 
 
Table 3 Computation times for verification of digital 
signatures 
 
 Number of 
Verifications 
Time [s]  
1,7GHz 
Time [s]  
1,8 GHz
1 1 0.002 0.00187 
2 256 * m / (m + n)  0.3072 0.2872 
 
Table 4 Computation times for verification of  MACs (n = 
128 bits) of a message (m = 192 bits) 
 
 Number of 
Verifications 
Time [s]  
1,7 GHz 
Time [s]  
1,8 GHz
1 1 0.00424 0.004 
2 256 * m / (m + n)  0.543 0,512 
 
Table 5 Computation times for verification of H-MACs (n = 160 bits) of 
a message (m = 160 bits) 
 
8. Conclusion and Further Work 
 
In this paper the principles of Soft Input Decryption are 
presented, as well as results of various simulations. The 
application of the Soft Input Decryption method is shown 
using different scenarios. The coding gain of 
cryptographic check error rates which is more than 2 dB in 
case of SID blocks of length of 320 bits show that Soft 
Input Decryption is a promising method which 
characteristics have to be examined for further use and 
improvement. 
 
Different strategies for changing of bits are possible, 
depending on a used system and error distribution. In this 
paper a static strategy is used, but also other possible 
strategies as dynamic and BER strategy are mentioned. 
These and other suggestions for new strategies are for 
further study. 
The performance of L-values is analyzed by comparison of 
results of tests and theoretical calculations. It is shown that 
the L-values are not reliable, because bits with lower |L|-
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values are not necessarily wrong bits. For that reason 
much more L-values have to be tested, than it would be 
necessary if the wrong bits would really have the lowest 
|L|-values. Results show that L-values become less reliable 
with decreasing of Eb/N0. 
 
Existing results of performances of L-values (for SID 
blocks of length of 128, 160 and 320 bit) are used for 
generation of equations which approximately find the 
number of needed L-values for the correction of defined 
percentage of SID blocks. Results of approximation are 
confirmed by comparison to the known results of tests for 
SID blocks of length of 384 bits. By extrapolation of 
calculated equations on SID blocks of length 1024 bit, the 
number of needed L-values has been calculated, instead of 
performing of long Soft Input Decryption tests. 
 
Time performance of Soft Input Decryption depends on 
used cryptographic mechanisms (digital signature, MAC 
or H-MAC). The surprising results is that digital 
signatures show very good performance results when the 
time needed for verification of “neighboured” signatures is 
improved.  
 
The future work should focus on improvement of 
arithmetical efficiency of cryptography for Soft Input 
Decryption to achieve faster verification process in a 
scope of Soft input Decryption and to prove the 
assumption used in row 3 of Table 3. 
 
Section 3.2 more sophisticated strategies of Soft Input 
Decryption instead of static strategy have been outlined. 
Further studies will elaborate these strategies and test the 
performance. 
 
Investigation of Soft Input Decryption should be also 
applied to standardized turbo codes for 3G, using the fact 
that the remaining errors after turbo coding are very often 
grouped (flipping of corresponding groups of bits). 
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